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A recurrent theme in economics is that “short-run” impacts are mitigated in the 
“long run” by economic agents’ adjustments. The idea is central to the impact 
of global climate change (Mendelsohn, Nordhaus, and Shaw 1994; Schlenker, 
Hanemann, and Fisher 2006; Deschenes and Greenstone 2007; Dell, Jones, and 
Olken forthcoming; Guiteras 2009; Schlenker and Roberts 2009; Olmstead and 
Rhode 2011). Theoretical differences between short-run and long-run effects are 
well-known, but empirical evidence is needed to gauge the speed and magnitude 
of long-run adjustment in different contexts (see, e.g., Blanchard and Katz 1992; 
Bresnahan and Ramey 1993; Foster and Rosenzweig 1995; Duflo 2004; Chetty et 
al. 2011). Historical settings provide a unique opportunity to identify adjustments 
that may occur over long periods of time (Carrington 1996; Margo 1997; Davis and 
Weinstein 2002; Collins and Margo 2007; Redding and Sturm 2008; Miguel and 
Roland 2011).
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The 1930s American Dust Bowl was an environmental catastrophe 
that greatly eroded sections of the Plains. The Dust Bowl is estimated 
to have immediately, substantially, and persistently reduced agricul-
tural land values and revenues in more-eroded counties relative to 
less-eroded counties. During the Depression and through at least 
the 1950s, there was limited relative adjustment of farmland away 
from activities that became relatively less productive in more-eroded 
areas. Agricultural adjustments recovered less than 25 percent of the 
initial difference in agricultural costs for more-eroded counties. The 
economy adjusted predominantly through large relative population 
declines in more-eroded counties, both during the 1930s and through 
the 1950s. (JEL N32, N52, Q15, Q18, Q54)
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This paper analyzes the aftermath of large and permanent soil erosion during the 
1930s that became widely known as the “American Dust Bowl.” Large dust storms 
swept topsoil from the land such that, by the 1940s, many Plains areas had cumu-
latively lost more than 75 percent of their original topsoil. Detailed data allow for 
an examination of relative adjustment from 1940 to the present, and the empirical 
analysis compares changes between more-eroded counties and less-eroded counties 
within the same state and with similar pre-1930s characteristics.
The relative impacts of erosion are interpreted using a model of agricultural pro-
duction in which land allocations are fixed in the short run. Declines in agricultural 
production possibilities are immediately capitalized into lower land values. Land 
allocations can adjust in the long run, which leads to a partial recovery in land rents. 
Land values decrease by less than rents in the short run, only to the extent that land 
rents are expected to recover. Outside the agricultural sector, more-eroded counties 
may also adjust through relative population declines and increased nonagricultural 
land use. The Dust Bowl may have general equilibrium effects on noneroded coun-
ties, so it is difficult to quantify the total impact of the Dust Bowl on eroded coun-
ties. Instead, the empirical analysis focuses on the speed and magnitude of relative 
agricultural adjustments in more-eroded counties, the resulting relative difference in 
short-run and long-run agricultural costs, and the geographic reallocation of labor 
and capital.
The Dust Bowl is estimated to have imposed substantial relative long-run agri-
cultural costs in more-eroded counties. From 1930 to 1940, more-eroded counties 
experienced large and permanent relative declines in agricultural land values: the per 
acre value of farmland declined by 30 percent in high-erosion counties and declined 
by 17 percent in medium-erosion counties, relative to changes in low-erosion coun-
ties. Agricultural revenues declined substantially and immediately in more-eroded 
counties relative to less-eroded counties, and these revenue declines mostly per-
sisted over time. Two calculations, based on the persistence of lower revenues and 
a comparison between immediate declines in revenues and land values, imply that 
long-run relative agricultural adjustments recovered less than 25 percent of the ini-
tial difference in agricultural costs for more-eroded counties.
Observed relative adjustments in agricultural land use were limited and slow, con-
sistent with the estimated persistent short-run costs. While full recovery may not 
be expected in more-eroded areas, there were some potentially productive land-
use adjustments. Consistent with contemporaries’ recommendations for land-use 
adjustment, erosion decreased the relative productivity of land for crops (compared 
to animals) and for wheat (compared to hay). Through the Great Depression and 
into the 1950s, however, there was not substantial relative adjustment of farmland 
in more-eroded counties from crops to pasture or from wheat to hay. Total farm-
land declined slowly and moderately in more-eroded counties, reflecting an inelastic 
demand for land in nonagricultural sectors.
The main margin of economic adjustment was large relative population declines 
in more-eroded counties, reflecting both out-migration and diverted in-migration. 
Population declined substantially from 1930 to 1940 in more-eroded counties rela-
tive to less-eroded counties, coinciding with out-migration from the entire region. 
Labor market equilibrium was reestablished through further relative declines in pop-
ulation rather than through capital inflows and an increase in local industry.
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The Great Depression may have partly accounted for limited agricultural adjust-
ment and persistence in costs. Contemporaries discussed four main potential barriers 
to land-use adjustment, including: limited access to capital; small farm sizes; land 
tenancy; and surplus labor. Some estimates suggest that access to capital enabled 
faster land-use adjustment, and there is limited support for the other explanations.
Overall, the Dust Bowl is estimated to have imposed substantial and persis-
tent relative agricultural costs in more-eroded Plains counties. Adjustment took 
place mainly through relative declines in land values and population, while rela-
tive changes in agricultural land use were limited and slow. Historical experiences 
from the American Dust Bowl highlight that agricultural costs from environmental 
destruction may not be mostly mitigated by agricultural adjustments, and that popu-
lation declines may be the primary margin of economic adjustment.
I. Historical Background
In the late nineteenth century, agricultural production began to expand substan-
tially on the American Plains, and native grasslands were increasingly plowed up for 
crops. The Plains experienced severe drought during the 1930s, particularly in 1934 
and 1936, which led to widespread crop failure. This loss of ground cover made 
farmland susceptible to self-perpetuating dust storms (wind erosion) and substantial 
runoff during occasional heavy rains (water erosion).
Dust storms in the 1930s blew enormous quantities of topsoil off Plains farmland; 
on “Black Sunday” in 1935, one such storm blanketed East Coast cities in a haze.1 
The dust storms were unexpected and some feared that the region would become 
the once-imagined “American Desert” (Science 1934; Newsweek 1936).2, 3 The Dust 
Bowl period continued through 1938 and ended with the return of wetter weather 
and increased ground cover.4
In the aftermath of the Dust Bowl, much farmland was left severely eroded. A 
Kansas agricultural experiment station released a 1941 bulletin on “reestablishing 
native grasses by the hay method” (Wenger 1941). While regrassing was expected 
to occur naturally over 25 to 40 years on Kansas lands eroded during the Dust Bowl, 
the “hay method” was developed in 1937 to speed this process and increase returns 
from pasture. In Colorado, where cropland and pasture had been damaged by pro-
longed drought and overgrazing, reseeding and conversion of cropland to pasture 
were recommended to assist the slow natural revegetation process (Nelson and 
1 The Dust Bowl was caused by a combination of prolonged severe drought and intensive land use (Soil 
Conservation Service (SCS) 1935, Hoyt 1936, Wallace 1938, SCS 1939, SCS 1955, Worster 1979, Hurt 1981, 
Cunfer 2005, and Hansen 2005). Hansen and Libecap (2004) present evidence that externalities contributed to the 
Dust Bowl: while farmers could discourage wind erosion by fallowing land or converting cropland to grasslands and 
pasture, much of the benefit would be captured by neighboring farms.
2 Due to periodic blowing soil, some Plains residents were afflicted with dust pneumonia. Cutler, Miller, and 
Norton (2007) do not detect later health effects among cohorts from regions more exposed in utero to crop yield 
shocks during the Dust Bowl.
3 Science. 1934. “The Recent Destructive Dust Cloud.” 79 (2056): 473. and Newsweek. 1936. “Drought: A 
Merciless Sun and a Scourge of Insects Destroy Crops, Cattle and Men–Two-thirds of the Country Afflicted.” July 18.
4 Worster (1979, p. 30) reports a substantial wind erosion area in 1940, which Cunfer (since publishing) discov-
ered to be erroneous: it is based on a 1940 United States Department of Agriculture (USDA) document, which cites 
a December 8, 1939 Washington Evening Star newspaper article, which in turn cites information provided by SCS 
technicians. The displayed 1940 wind erosion region was projected in 1939, and the 1940 USDA document states 
that the projections proved incorrect and that there turned out to be little blowing.
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Shepherd 1940). An agricultural experiment station and extension service in Iowa 
reported estimated impacts of seeding,  fertilizer, and lime on the pasture productiv-
ity of eroded former cropland (Hughes and Thorp 1940).
The newly formed Soil Conservation Service (SCS) encouraged farmers to shift 
land from wheat and other row crops into hay and pasture, where productivity was 
less affected by erosion and production was less likely to cause additional erosion 
(SCS 1936, SCS 1939, SCS 1941).5 A Kansas experiment station and extension 
service suggested that greater agricultural success could be obtained by increased 
emphasis on livestock and shifting cropland from relatively less productive areas to 
more productive areas (Pine 1942).
For such land-use adjustment to be economically viable, the SCS anticipated that 
farm size increases and population declines would be necessary. Land tenancy was 
cited as a major obstacle to land-use adjustment, as tenants’ short-term incentives 
were thought to encourage the overuse of land (McDonald 1938). Experimental SCS 
land-use adjustment programs were associated with long-term income gains, but 
farmers’ participation was thought to be limited partly by access to credit; reasons 
cited by the SCS include high interest rates, short-term income needs for consump-
tion and mortgage payments, lack of equipment, and a general lack of finances.6
National agricultural policies attempted to reduce production of certain crops and 
animal products, though the initial motivation was to raise prices, increase farm 
income, and stimulate the Depression economy. The 1933 Agricultural Adjustment 
Act paid farmers to reduce planted crop acreages, and the government purchased 
and destroyed livestock (Leuchtenburg 1963; Saloutos 1982; Volanto 2005). After 
the Supreme Court declared aspects of these programs unconstitutional, efforts to 
increase prices were combined with erosion control and conservation in the 1935 
and 1936 Soil Conservation and Domestic Allotment Acts and the 1938 Agricultural 
Adjustment Act (Rasmussen 1979; Phillips 2007). Subsequent federal agricultural 
policy continued in attempts to support crop prices while limiting expansion of crop 
acreages.
Figure 1 presents aggregate changes in agriculture and population on the Plains 
over the twentieth century.7 Total farmland increased from 1910 through the 
1940s, remained constant, and declined slightly during the 1970s. Total population 
increased steadily over this time period, though somewhat below trend from 1930 
to 1960. Of particular interest, the total value of agricultural land and agricultural 
revenue changed similarly over the sample period: booming during World War I, 
falling during the 1930s, and generally increasing since 1940.
5 The SCS was established in 1935 to research and demonstrate the effectiveness of soil conservation techniques: 
converting cropland to grassland; planting alternate strips of cash crops and drought-resistant crops; fallowing land 
with protective cover; retaining crop residues on harvested land; and plowing along contour lines. The SCS began 
to oversee some Civilian Conservation Corps work camps and directed efforts to terrace land, rehabilitate gullies, 
and plant trees as wind breaks.
6 These arguments were echoed by those at Agricultural Experiment Stations and Extension Services in Montana 
(Renne 1936) and Iowa (Schickele, Himmel, and Iowa Agricultural Experiment Station 1936). Rural rehabilitation 
programs partly encouraged land-use adjustment and “balanced farming” by providing finance through the Farm 
Credit Administration, Farm Security Administration, and the Resettlement Administration (Grant 2002).
7 These aggregate measures are calculated in each reported period by summing over the same 779 Plains counties 
(mapped in Figure 2).
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II. Theoretical Framework
A. Agricultural Production: Short-Run versus Long-Run
Dust Bowl erosion was a major shock that reduced agricultural rents in the short 
run and long run. In this simple model, farmland values decrease immediately to 
reflect the present discounted value of lost agricultural rents. Land values decrease 
by a smaller percentage than agricultural rents in the short run, only to the extent 
that subsequent land-use adjustments mitigate the long-run costs from erosion.
Assume that a farmer produces one composite agricultural good and allocates a 
share θ of land between two production technologies,  F 1 (θ,  V 1 ) and  F 2 (1 − θ,  V 2 ). 
Variable inputs V, e.g., labor, are chosen in each period to obtain the maximum 
rent from technology 1 ( Π 1 (θ)) and technology 2 ( Π 2 (1 − θ)). The two produc-
tion technologies reflect methods or inputs that may be costly to adjust quickly 
(e.g., cropland versus pasture, or wheat versus hay). All prices are set in competi-
tive markets.
Panel A. Log farmland acres Panel B. Log population

























1910 1920 1930 1940 1950 1960 1970 1980 1990 2000
Figure 1. Aggregate Changes on the Plains in Agriculture and Population
Notes: Data are from the US Census of Population and the US Census of Agriculture (Haines 2005; Gutmann 
2005). Each panel reports values aggregated in each period over the same 779 sample counties mapped in Figure 2. 
Panel A reports the log total acres of land in farms. Panel B reports the log total population. Panel C reports the log 
total value of land in farms. Panel D reports the log total value of agricultural revenue.
1482 THE AMERICAN ECONOMIC REVIEW JuNE 2012
In an unconstrained initial equilibrium, the farmer chooses an optimal land alloca-
tion  
_ θ such that  Π 1 ′ ( _ θ) =  Π 2 ′ (1 −  _ θ).8 The farmer obtains an initial rent  π I , equal to Π 1 ( _ θ) +  Π 2 (1 −  _ θ). The value of land equals the present discounted value of rents, π I /(1 − β), where β is a constant discount factor.
At some time period t = 0, the Dust Bowl unexpectedly and permanently 
decreases the relative profitability of the first technology; i.e.,  Π 1 (θ) decreases to δ Π 1 (θ) and δ ∈ (0, 1). In the “short run,” when t < T, the land allocation is con-
strained at its previous level (θ =  _ θ). This short-run land allocation constraint 
binds because δ Π 1 ′ ( _ θ) <  Π 2 ′ (1 −  _ θ). The farmer earns a short-run rent  π SR equal to δ Π 1 ( _ θ) +  Π 2 (1 −  _ θ).
In the “long run,” when t = T, a new optimal land allocation is chosen such 
that δ Π 1 ′ (  θ) =  Π 2 ′ (1 −   θ). Land is shifted from the first technology (  θ <  _ θ), and 
land rents partly recover ( π SR <  π LR <  π I ).9 In particular, land rents increase from 
the short run to the long run by  ∫  θ  
_ θ  Π 2 ′ (1 − x) − δ Π 1 ′ (x) dx; intuitively, the dif-
ference in marginal rents is regained for each land unit adjusted. Taking a first-
order Taylor expansion of each marginal rent function around  
_ θ, the term simplifies to 
(1/2)( _ θ −   θ)(1 − δ) Π 1 ′ ( _ θ).10 Thus, the recovery in land rents is proportional to the 
adjustment in land allocation.11
Land values are particularly informative about the effectiveness of long-run adjust-
ment. In each period 0 ≤ t ≤ T − 1, the value of land is  ∑ i=t T−1  π SR β i +  ∑ i=T ∞  π LR β i ; 
for t ≥ T, the value of land is  π LR /(1 − β).12 Initially, land values fall by a smaller 
percentage than rents to the extent that rents will recover.13 Over time, land values 
increase as land rents increase, though by a smaller percentage than land rents.14 
Additionally, the initial decrease in land values at t = 0 capitalizes the full present 
discounted value of lost rents from erosion.15
The binding short-run constraint on land allocation is of analytical convenience, 
but it can be interpreted as a simplified case of unconstrained adjustment with 
adjustment costs that are convex or decline over time. Adjustment costs may be 
convex if capital or other adjustment inputs have an upward-sloping supply curve 
in each period. Adjustment costs may decline over time due to learning-by-doing 
or other positive spillovers in technological adoption (Griliches 1957; Foster and 
8 The condition assumes that the profit functions are differentiable and concave, focusing on interior solutions 
and technological adjustment. If the initial equilibrium were a corner solution, later adoption of the other technol-
ogy could be interpreted as technological change.
9 The farmer earns a long-run rent  π LR equal to δ Π 1 (  θ) +  Π 2 (1 −   θ).
10 The value of this “adjustment triangle” corresponds to one-half the change in land allocation multiplied by the 
initial decrease in marginal return. The approximation is exact if  Π 2 ′ (1 −  _ θ) and  Π 1 ′ ( _ θ) are linear.
11 Note that the land allocation changes more when there is a larger decrease in marginal return, and when 
marginal returns are less sensitive to changes in land allocation. Rearranging terms from the Taylor expansion, 
the change in land allocation (  θ −  _ θ) equals the initial decrease in marginal return ((1 − δ) Π 1 ′ ( _ θ)), divided by the 
summed slopes of the two technologies’ marginal returns at the initial equilibrium ( Π 2 ″ (1 −  _ θ) +  Π 1 ″ ( _ θ)).
12 Land values in each period are set equal to the net present value of agricultural rents, given a rent stream of 
π SR until period T and  π LR thereafter.
13 Rearranging terms, the value of land at t = 0 is  π SR /(1 − β) + ( π LR −  π SR ) ∑ i=T ∞  β i . Land value is greater 
than the PDV of short-run rents (the first term) when the long-run increase in rents is larger and the long run is 
achieved sooner.
14 Rearranging terms, the value of land in each period 0 ≤ t ≤ T − 1 is  π LR /(1 − β) − ( π LR −  π SR ) ∑ i=t T  β i . 
Land values increase as periods of short-run rents are past and periods of long-run rents become more immediate.
15 Rearranging terms, the value of land at t = 0 is ( β T π LR + (1 −  β T ) π SR )(1 − β). Intuitively, land value is a 
weighted average of long-run profits and short-run profits, where the weights are the relative value of each.
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Rosenzweig 1995; Sutch 2010).16 Land values increase whenever adjustment costs 
are paid and fixed to the land; otherwise, the empirical predictions are similar when 
allowing for adjustment costs.17
B. General Equilibrium Effects of the Dust Bowl
If Dust Bowl erosion directly affects agricultural production, then there may be 
indirect effects on population and industrial outcomes. In addition, noneroded areas 
may be affected indirectly by changes in prices and mobile factors. This section 
applies a Roback (1982) model to a rural setting and outlines how erosion might 
affect agriculture, population, and industry in eroded areas relative to noneroded 
areas.
In this model, there are two locations (eroded and noneroded). Two sectors (agri-
culture and industry) produce freely tradeable goods using two homogeneous fac-
tors (land and labor). The supply of land is fixed in each location. Labor is supplied 
by workers, who pay a cost to change location or sector. Workers consume land, 
agricultural goods, and industrial goods. Assuming perfectly competitive markets, 
all prices (land values, wages, and prices for agricultural and industrial goods) are 
set such that each market clears.
Assume that Dust Bowl erosion decreases agricultural productivity in the eroded 
location. Farmland demand declines in the eroded location; if supply is inelastic 
then the value of land decreases with little decrease in total farmland. Agricultural 
output decreases in the eroded location, so the price of agricultural output increases 
in both locations. Higher output prices increase farmland demand in the noneroded 
location and the value of land increases. Thus, the decline in land values in the 
eroded location relative to the noneroded location overstates the absolute decline in 
land values in the eroded location.
Assume further that Dust Bowl erosion decreases agricultural labor productivity 
in the eroded location. Workers move to the noneroded location and/or switch to the 
industrial sector. Wages remain lower in the eroded location (and agricultural sector) 
to the extent that there are costs to moving (and switching sectors).18 Lower wages 
encourage labor-intensive production in the agricultural sector, and the expansion of 
industrial production.19 Population increases in the noneroded location and wages 
decrease, so relative geographic comparisons overstate out-migration and understate 
wage declines in the eroded location.
In general, Dust Bowl erosion can affect the noneroded location through changes 
in shared prices. Erosion discourages certain types of production in the eroded 
location, increases output prices, and encourages those types of production in the 
16 Even with costless adjustment, the potential for learning to resolve uncertainty about optimal adjustments can 
delay investment (Dixit and Pindyck 1994; Bloom, Bond, and Van Reenen 2007). Past crop-specific investments 
may also depreciate over time, discouraging early adjustment (Chari and Hopenhayn 1991).
17 Intuitively, the land allocation adjusts less and there is less recovery in rents. In a stark example, assume 
shifting land L from technology 1 to 2 requires a one-time nonrecoverable cost  C 12 (L) to be paid in period T. If 
some land adjustment remains optimal, it satisfies (1 − δ) Π 1 ′ (  θ) =  Π 2 ′ (1 −   θ) − (1 − β) C 12 ′ ( _ θ −   θ). Effectively (1 − β) of the adjustment cost is paid in each period, but any capital constraints would make full initial adjustment 
more costly.
18 Workers consume land, which is cheaper in the eroded location, so paid wages decrease by more than local 
price-adjusted wages.
19 Lower land prices also encourage the expansion of industrial production.
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 noneroded location. Thus, relative changes in production will overstate the absolute 
degree of adjustment in the eroded location.
III. Data Construction and Baseline Characteristics by Erosion Level
County-level data on agriculture, population, and industry are drawn from the US 
census of agriculture, census of population, and census of manufacturing (Gutmann 
2005; Haines 2005). Variables of interest include the value and quantity of agricul-
tural land, agricultural revenue and capital, total cropland and pasture, revenue from 
crops or animals, production and acreage for specific crops, number of farms, popu-
lation, rural population, farm population, retail sales, manufacturing workers and 
establishments, and unemployment (see Data Appendix). Other data sources include 
banking data from the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (Haines 2005);  New 
Deal expenditures from the Office of Government Reports (Fishback, Horrace, and 
Kantor 2005); and drought data from the National Climatic Data Center (Boustan, 
Fishback, and Kantor 2010).
The main sample is a balanced panel of 779 Plains counties from 1910 to 1997. 
The 1924 USDA Atlas of Agriculture is used to define a contiguous set of ecologi-
cally similar Plains counties within the sample states (USDA 1924).20 To account 
for county border changes, census data are adjusted in later periods to maintain the 
1910 county definitions (Hornbeck 2010).
Figure 2 displays the sample counties, overlaid with a map of cumulative erosion 
damage after the Dust Bowl. The white area is low erosion (less than 25 percent of 
topsoil lost), light gray is medium erosion (25 percent to 75 percent of topsoil lost), 
and dark gray is high erosion (more than 75 percent of topsoil lost).21 There is no 
direct measure of topsoil lost during the 1930s because detailed erosion surveys only 
began in the 1930s, and were based on soil measurements by specialists sent to each 
county (SCS 1935).22 Thus, the empirical analysis uses cumulative erosion damage 
as a proxy for differential erosion during the 1930s, and the methodology is designed 
to address omitted variable bias arising from the absence of pre-1930s erosion data.23
20 Excluded non-Plains counties have less than 50 percent of their area in the typical central United States grass-
land and forest vegetation regions (Tall Grass, Short Grass, Mesquite Grass, Mesquite and Desert Grass Savanna, 
and Oak-Hickory Forest). In practice, this excludes a ring of ecologically dissimilar counties in western Montana, 
central and western Wyoming/Colorado/New Mexico, southwestern Texas, eastern Texas, southeastern Oklahoma, 
and northeastern Minnesota. The empirical results are robust to excluding Iowa and Minnesota.
21 The cumulative erosion map was prepared by the SCS “based on the 1934 Reconnaissance Erosion Survey 
and other surveys.” The map was obtained from the National Archives and traced erosion regions were merged with 
county borders using Geographic Information Systems software. The National Archives maintains records of the 
SCS and its predecessor, the Soil Erosion Service (SES), which contain three identical versions of the map with 
publishing dates of 1948, 1951, and 1954. There are no other erosion maps from December 1937 until the next 
period of substantial erosion in the mid-1950s.
22 The SES was established in 1933 (replaced in 1935 by the SCS) and published the very detailed 1934 
Reconnaissance Erosion Survey. In August 1936, the SCS published a map of which general areas had been affected 
to different degrees and a second, more detailed map in December 1937. All erosion maps indicate the cumulative 
severity (slight, moderate, severe) of wind erosion or water erosion, though the level of detail and definition of 
categories changes over time.
23 Intuitively, the desired independent variable is (erosio n post − erosio n pre ) and the included variable is only 
erosio n post . Thus, the variable erosio n pre appears negatively in the error term, and will bias the estimated coefficient on 
erosio n post depending on its correlation with the dependent variable after conditioning on any control variables. The 
estimating equation includes a number of control variables that may proxy for pre-1930s erosion. The Results Appendix 
reports estimates from two specification checks. One specification check instruments for erosio n post using 1930s 
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Measured erosion levels may be correlated with pre-1930s county characteristics 
for two reasons. First, some erosion differences may have occurred prior to the Dust 
Bowl and have been caused by, reflected in, or otherwise jointly determined with pre-
1930s county characteristics.24 Second, the intensity of Dust Bowl erosion may have 
been partly determined by county land use. The main empirical challenge is that coun-
ties with different pre-1930s characteristics may have changed differently after the 
weather. Another specification check, similar to a difference-in-difference-in-difference estimate, contrasts the main 
estimated effects with the estimated effect of erosio n post in non-Plains areas that did not experience Dust Bowl erosion.
24 For example, intensive land use over many decades may have caused higher 1920s erosion levels in Iowa, 
as compared to the Texas panhandle. Alternatively, high erosion levels in the 1920s may reduce land values in the 
1920s or discourage the production of soil-sensitive crops. Finally, climate or topology may affect county outcomes 





Figure 2. The 779 Main Sample Counties, Shaded by Erosion Level
Notes: Mapped erosion levels are indicated as low (less than 25 percent of topsoil lost), medium (25 percent to 
75 percent of topsoil lost and may have some gullies), or high (more than 75 percent of topsoil lost and may have 
numerous or deep gullies). Thin lines denote 1910 county borders, corresponding to the main sample of 779 coun-
ties described in Table 1. Thick lines denote state boundaries. Crossed out areas are not in the sample. 
source: National Archives (College Park, MD), RG 114, Cartographic Records of the Soil Conservation 
Service, #149.
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1930s, even if the Dust Bowl had not occurred. For example, an increase in the relative 
price of corn would differentially increase revenues in areas growing more corn.
Table 1 reports mean county characteristics in 1930 (column 1) and estimated 
within-state differences based on measured post-1930s erosion levels (columns 2 
and 3). Among the reported characteristics, there is a statistically significant cor-
relation between higher erosion and higher land values, higher agricultural density, 
more cropland in corn, less cropland in wheat and hay, and more animals. High-
erosion and medium-erosion counties were more similar (column 4). Because pre-
1930s differences may predict differential changes after 1930, the empirical analysis 
focuses on specifications that control for differential changes over time that are cor-
related with the reported 1930 county characteristics and available lagged values of 
those characteristics in 1925, 1920, and 1910 (see Data Appendix).25 These control 
variables also proxy for the omitted pre-1930s erosion variable, to the extent that 
pre-1930s erosion is correlated with these outcome variables of interest.
IV. Empirical Framework
The empirical analysis is based on estimating average changes for more-eroded 
counties, relative to changes for less-eroded counties in the same state and with 
similar pre-1930s characteristics. Formally, outcome  Y ct in county c and year t is 
differenced from its value in 1930. This difference is regressed on the fraction of the 
county in medium-erosion ( M c ) and high-erosion ( H c ) regions, a state-by-year fixed 
effect ( α st ), pre-1930s county characteristics ( X c ), and an error term ( ϵ ct ):
(1)   Y ct −  Y c1930 =  β 1t  M c +  β 2t  H c +  α st +  θ t X c +  ϵ ct .
Note that the effects of erosion and each county characteristic are allowed to vary in 
each year. The sample is balanced in each regression; i.e., every county included has 
data in every analyzed period.26
The included controls for county characteristics are the variables in panels B, 
C, D, and E of Table 1, and their values for all available pre-1930 periods (see 
Data Appendix). Each regression also controls for the outcome variable in 1930 and 
all available pre-1930 periods. Along these observable dimensions, differentially 
eroded counties are thereby allowed to experience systematically different changes 
after 1930. For example, counties with lower land values in 1925 and higher land 
values in 1930 are allowed to experience different land value changes from 1930 to 
1940.27
The identification assumption is that counties with different measured erosion 
 levels would have changed the same after the 1930s if not for the Dust Bowl. In 
25 Specifications do not control for county characteristics after 1930, which are potential outcomes of the Dust 
Bowl.
26 For this class of regression, in which the sample is balanced and the regressors are fully interacted with each 
time period, differencing the data and including county fixed effects yield numerically identical coefficients (as in 
the case of two time periods). Both methods improve the estimates’ precision by absorbing fixed county character-
istics. Differencing is more efficient when the untransformed error term is closer to a random walk, the differenced 
coefficients are easier to interpret, and differencing is computationally faster.
27 This econometric model is preferable to controlling directly for trends in land values, which would contradict 
economic theory on the nonpredictability of past asset price trends.
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Table 1—County Characteristics in 1930, by Post–Dust Bowl Erosion Level









(1) (2) (3) (4)
Panel A. Value
Log value of farmland and buildings, 3.377 0.297** 0.241 −0.056
 per acre in farms [0.889] (0.094) (0.140) (0.102)
Log value of farmland, 3.178 0.264** 0.211 −0.052
 per acre in farms [0.851] (0.092) (0.136) (0.099)
Log value of all farm products, 1.959 0.268** 0.193 −0.074
 per acre in farms [0.802] (0.083) (0.122) (0.094)
Panel B. Land use
Acres of land in farms, 0.834 0.012 −0.038 −0.050**
 per county acre [0.153] (0.018) (0.021) (0.019)
Acres of cropland, 0.457 0.048 −0.003 −0.050
 per acre in farms [0.236] (0.027) (0.036) (0.028)
Panel C. Population and farms
Population, per 100 county acres 3.242 1.109 1.223 0.114
[6.871] (0.694) (0.761) (0.711)
Fraction of population, rural areas 0.825 −0.014 0.038 0.051
[0.215] (0.030) (0.042) (0.041)
Fraction of population, on farms 0.549 0.035 0.056 0.021
[0.164] (0.022) (0.031) (0.031)
Farms, per 100 county acres 0.292 0.151** 0.154** 0.003
[0.239] (0.023) (0.030) (0.031)
Average farm size (acres) 685 −341** −425** −84
[1,022] (128) (144) (99)
Panel D. Cropland allocation
Fraction corn 0.167 0.066** 0.193** 0.128**
[0.163] (0.016) (0.025) (0.023)
Fraction wheat 0.208 −0.054* −0.117** −0.063
[0.217] (0.027) (0.035) (0.036)
Fraction hay 0.130 −0.034 −0.088* −0.054**
[0.132] (0.025) (0.038) (0.020)
Fraction cotton 0.108 0.053** 0.017 −0.036
[0.211] (0.019) (0.019) (0.021)
Fraction oats, barley, and rye 0.125 0.003 −0.030* −0.033**
[0.113] (0.009) (0.012) (0.010)
Panel E. Animal production
Cattle, per county acre 0.053 0.006 0.010** 0.005
[0.033] (0.003) (0.004) (0.004)
Swine, per county acre 0.056 0.035** 0.055** 0.020
[0.091] (0.007) (0.012) (0.010)
Chickens, per county acre 0.261 0.112** 0.121** 0.009
[0.272] (0.022) (0.032) (0.031)
Notes: Column 1 reports average values for the 779 sample counties (Figure 2). Counties are weighted by acres 
of farmland in 1930, and the standard deviation is reported in brackets. Columns 2 and 3 report coefficients from 
a single regression of the indicated county characteristic in 1930 on the fraction of the county in medium erosion 
and in high erosion (low erosion is omitted), conditional on state fixed effects and weighted by acres of farmland 
in 1930. Column 4 reports the difference between the coefficients in columns 2 and 3. Robust standard errors are 
reported in parentheses. 
** Significant at the 1 percent level.
 * Significant at the 5 percent level.
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practice, this assumption must hold after controlling for differential changes 
over each period that are correlated with state and the included pre-1930s county 
characteristics.
Three other estimation details are worth noting. First, to condense the reported 
results, the specifications often pool the erosion variables for some combination of 
later time periods. Pooled estimates amount to averaging the estimated βs for the 
pooled years, as the control variable effects are allowed to vary in each year. Second, 
regressions for agricultural outcomes are weighted by county farmland in 1930 (or 
an analogous land measure) to estimate the average effect for an acre of farmland. 
Regressions for labor outcomes are weighted by county population in 1930 to estimate 
the average effect for a person. Third, standard errors are clustered at the county level 
to adjust for heteroskedasticity and within-county correlation over time.28
V. Results
A. Agricultural Land Value and Revenue
To illustrate the empirical methodology and analyze relative changes in the log value 
of agricultural land and buildings per acre of farmland, Figure 3 graphs estimated β s 
from versions of equation (1). Panel A includes only state-by-year fixed effects as 
controls for regional differences in agricultural development and public policy (e.g., 
Oklahoma’s late statehood and differences in statewide relief efforts and agricultural 
extension services). Panel B also includes 1930 county characteristics, interacted with 
year, as controls for differential effects of changes in agricultural prices and technol-
ogy (e.g., controlling for baseline corn allocations to adjust for differential effects from 
changes in the relative return to corn). Panel C includes county characteristics avail-
able from 1910 to 1925, interacted with year, as additional measures of county differ-
ences in agricultural suitability.29 After World War I, from 1920 to 1930, land values in 
high-erosion and medium-erosion counties were similar to land values in low-erosion 
counties in both levels and trends. Panel D includes controls for pre-1930s differences 
in land values, implementing the full version of equation (1).30
After the 1930s Dust Bowl, agricultural land values declined in high-erosion 
and medium-erosion counties relative to changes in low-erosion counties. Land 
values also declined in high-erosion counties relative to medium-erosion counties, 
comparing the two lines graphed in Figure 3. The relative declines in land values 
were substantial and persistent.
28 Conley standard errors were also estimated for changes in land values from 1930 to 1940 (Conley 1999), and 
were similar to standard errors clustered at the county level. The Conley method allows for outcomes to be cor-
related among nearby counties, with the degree of correlation declining linearly until some cutoff distance. Relative 
to county-clustered standard errors, the percent increase in Conley standard errors for changes in high-erosion 
versus low-erosion counties is: 7 (50-mile cutoff), 18 (100 mile), 18 (300 mile), 14 (500 mile), and 5 (700 mile). 
For changes in medium-erosion versus low-erosion counties, the percent increase in Conley standard errors is: 5 
(50-mile cutoff), 8 (100 mile), 9 (300 mile), 7 (500 mile), and −3 (700 mile). The Conley specifications are difficult 
to weight by county farmland levels, so the comparison is relative to unweighted county-clustered standard errors.
29 The included 1930 county characteristics are listed in Table 1, panels B to E. The Data Appendix describes the 
availability of these variables from 1910 to 1925.
30 The land value regression also controls for agricultural revenues per acre in 1930, 1925, 1920, and 1910, as 
the subsequent analysis combines both land value and revenue specifications in a seemingly unrelated regression 
framework.
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Table 2, column 1, reports numerical results from estimating equation (1), as 
graphed in panel D of Figure 3. From 1930 to 1940, land values fell by 30 per-
cent in high-erosion counties and 17 percent in medium-erosion counties, relative to 
changes in low-erosion counties (panel A). Multiplying by agricultural land values 
in 1930, these estimates indicate a relative economic loss of $2.4 billion ($30 bil-
lion in 2007 dollars).31 This relative cost overstates the aggregate cost of the Dust 
Bowl to the extent that the Dust Bowl increased agricultural prices and raised land 
prices in low-erosion counties.32 This relative cost understates the aggregate cost 
31 Multiplying 1930 county farmland levels by the share of area in each erosion category, there were approxi-
mately 55 million farm acres in high-erosion areas and 197 million farm acres in medium-erosion areas. The per 
acre value of farmland was $58 in high-erosion counties and $44 in medium-erosion counties, weighting by farm-
land. The total cost is found by multiplying the acres affected, the value of the acres, and the percent decline in land 
values: $1 billion from high-erosion and $1.4 billion from medium-erosion counties.
32 The Dust Bowl substantially decreased production and may have increased agricultural prices, though it is 
difficult to know what agricultural prices would have been in the absence of the Dust Bowl. Prices for agricultural 
products increased during the 1934 and 1936 droughts, but declined over the entire 1930s in absolute levels and 
Panel A. State-by-year fixed effects Panel B. 1930 County characteristics + (A)
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Figure 3. Estimated Differences in Log Value of Farmland per Acre, by Erosion Level
Notes: Each panel graphs the estimated coefficients (β) from versions of equation (1) in the text. For each year, the 
solid circles and solid line report differences in the log per acre value of farmland and buildings for high-erosion 
counties, relative to low-erosion counties. The hollow squares and dashed line report differences for medium-ero-
sion counties, relative to low-erosion counties. In panel A, these coefficients are estimated by regressing the log 
per acre value of farmland and buildings on the fraction of a county in a high-erosion area (solid circle) and the 
fraction of a county in a medium-erosion area (hollow square), controlling for state-by-year fixed effects. Panel B 
also includes as controls the interaction between each year and each county characteristic in panels B–E of Table 1. 
Panel C also includes as controls the interaction between each year and the available lagged values of each county 
characteristic in panels B–E of Table 1 (see Data Appendix). Panel D also includes as controls the interaction 
between each year and the outcome variable in 1930 and in each lagged year.
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to the extent that the Dust Bowl also damaged low-erosion counties. As a further 
basis of comparison, the $2.4 billion cost represents seven percent of the decline in 
relative to the urban consumer price index. For a rough calculation, assume that the demand for agricultural land has 
an elasticity of −1. A $2.4 billion decline in farmland value reflects five percent of the total value of farmland in the 
United States in 1930, so low-erosion county land values may have increased by five percent (the spillover would 
be smaller if world agricultural markets are integrated and farmland demand is less inelastic, while the spillover 
would be larger if US markets are imperfectly integrated and a dollar of Plains farmland is an imperfect substitute 
for a dollar of non-Plains farmland). This calculation implies that, in absolute terms, land values in high-erosion 
and medium-erosion counties declined by 25 percent and 12 percent, respectively, implying a cost of $1.8 billion in 
eroded areas. For the overall economic cost, price increases benefit land owners in noneroded areas at the expense 
of consumers.
Table 2—Estimated Changes in Agricultural Land Value and Revenue, by Erosion Level
Change after 1930
Log land value Log revenue Ratio: (1)/(2)
(1) (2) (3)
Panel A. 1940
High erosion versus low erosion −0.300** −0.267** 1.123**
(0.038) (0.055) (0.184)
Medium erosion versus low erosion −0.166** −0.155** 1.069**
(0.030) (0.040) (0.226)
High erosion versus medium erosion (calculated) −0.134** −0.112* 1.197**
(0.032) (0.051) (0.418)
Averaged value (GLS) 1.109**
 (0.174)
Panel B. 1945
High erosion versus low erosion −0.223** −0.107**
(0.036) (0.038)
Medium erosion versus low erosion −0.080** −0.100**
(0.027) (0.030)
Panel C. 1950–1954 (pooled)
High erosion versus low erosion −0.289** −0.240**
(0.041) (0.049)
Medium erosion versus low erosion −0.144** −0.187**
(0.032) (0.037)
Panel D. 1959–1969 (pooled)
High erosion versus low erosion −0.340** −0.257**
(0.044) (0.058)
Medium erosion versus low erosion −0.183** −0.118**
(0.036) (0.042)
Panel E. 1978–1992 (pooled)
High erosion versus low erosion −0.286** −0.297**
(0.049) (0.080)
Medium erosion versus low erosion −0.110** −0.034
(0.041) (0.060)
R2 0.972 0.921
Sample counties 779 779
Notes: Columns 1 and 2 report estimates from equation (1) in the text, for the log value of agricultural land and 
buildings per acre of farmland (column 1) and the log value of agricultural revenue per acre of farmland (column 
2). Column 1 corresponds to panel D of Figure 3, where the estimated coefficients are pooled across the indicated 
years in each panel. Column 3 reports the ratio of the estimated coefficients in panel A of columns 1 and 2. Reported 
in parentheses are robust standard errors clustered by county.
** Significant at the 1 percent level.
 * Significant at the 5 percent level.
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GDP from 1930 to 1933 (Carter et al. 2006) or the total 1930 value of high-erosion 
farmland over an area the size of Oklahoma.
Panel B reports that land values in 1945 remained lower in high-erosion and 
medium-erosion counties, relative to land values in low-erosion counties. For 
conciseness, panels C to E pool the estimated coefficients in subsequent periods. 
Through the end of the sample period in 1992, land values continued to remain sub-
stantially lower in more-eroded counties. Overall, there is little indication of a sys-
tematic relative recovery in land values following the Dust Bowl. These estimates 
suggest that long-run economic adjustments did not lead to a substantial recovery in 
land rents and were not associated with substantial fixed investments, which would 
become capitalized in higher land values.
Changes in agricultural revenue measure the losses to agriculture in each time 
period. While the ideal variable would be agricultural rents, unobserved inputs can 
bias estimates of the impact of environmental shocks on imputed rents (Rosenzweig 
and Wolpin 2000). For a Cobb-Douglas production function, a productivity decline 
leads to the same percent declines in rents, revenue, and all inputs. Thus, the empiri-
cal analysis focuses on percent changes in agricultural revenue as a proxy for percent 
changes in agricultural rents. Estimated percent changes in observed inputs provide 
some guidance on when percent changes in revenue may overstate or understate the 
percent changes in rents.
Table 2, column 2, reports estimates from equation (1) for changes in the log value 
of agricultural revenue per acre of farmland. From 1930 to 1940, agricultural revenue 
declined by 27 percent in high-erosion counties and by 16 percent in medium-erosion 
counties, relative to changes in low-erosion counties (panel A). In later periods, rev-
enues only partially recovered in more-eroded counties relative to less-eroded coun-
ties. Two parameters of interest from the perspective of a farmer in 1940 are (a) the net 
present value of future revenue losses, and (b) the net present value of future revenue 
losses if there had been no recovery after 1940.33 The ratio of (a) to (b) reflects the 
economic loss (allowing for adjustment) as a fraction of the short-run economic loss 
(not allowing for adjustment). The estimated ratios (and standard errors) are 0.866 
(0.171) for high-erosion counties relative to low-erosion counties, 0.764 (0.203) for 
medium-erosion counties relative to low-erosion counties, and 1.007 (0.436) for high-
erosion counties relative to medium-erosion counties. Ratio values between 0.75 and 
1 indicate that relative agricultural adjustments recovered between 25 percent and 0 
percent of the initial relative agricultural cost.
Table 2, column 3, reports the ratio of percent declines in land values and agri-
cultural revenues from 1930 to 1940.34 In a similar exercise as above, the immedi-
ate decline in land values may reflect the economic loss (anticipating adjustment) 
and the immediate decline in revenues may reflect the short-run economic loss 
(not allowing for adjustment). The estimated ratios (and standard errors) are 1.123 
(0.184), 1.069 (0.226), and 1.197 (0.418). The efficient weighted average of these 
33 This calculation assumes an interest rate of five percent, linearly interpolates annual values between each 
census period, and assumes that revenue losses remain constant after 1992.
34 To obtain the standard error of the ratio, both coefficients are estimated through seemingly unrelated regres-
sion in which the same control variables are included in each regression.
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three ratios is 1.109 (0.174).35 The estimated average ratio is statistically greater 
than 0.761 and is statistically indistinguishable from 1, which implies that long-run 
relative adjustments mitigated less than 25 percent of the initial relative cost.
A strict interpretation of the estimated ratios requires that percent changes in rev-
enue are equal to percent changes in economic rents. Percent changes in observed 
input costs are informative about the difference between revenue and rents: if inputs 
initially decline by less than revenue, then rents initially decline by more than rev-
enue; if inputs recover more than revenue, then rents recover less than revenue. This 
pattern of results is found for agricultural capital (machinery and equipment), sug-
gesting that the land value ratio may overstate the degree of cost persistence and the 
revenue ratio may understate the degree of cost persistence.36 Overall, the estimated 
changes in land values and revenues are consistent with substantial short-run costs, 
persistent long-run costs, and adjustments that mitigated between 0 percent and 25 
percent of the initial relative cost in more-eroded counties.
B. Adjustment in Agricultural Production
Table 3 reports relative changes in agricultural production following the Dust 
Bowl, from estimating equation (1) for each agricultural outcome. On the extensive 
margin, more-eroded counties did not experience a substantial relative decline in 
total farmland through the 1930s and 1940s (column 1). By the 1950s, the frac-
tion of county land in farms had declined by two to four percentage points. Small 
declines in farmland and large declines in agricultural land values are consistent 
with an inelastic demand for land in other sectors of the economy. Further, these 
estimates suggest that estimated relative impacts of the Dust Bowl do not reflect 
large changes in the relative composition of farmland.
Within the agricultural sector, farmers had an incentive to reallocate land toward 
production activities that were less sensitive to soil quality. As discussed in Section I, 
contemporaries recommended that farmers convert eroded cropland to pasture.37 
Consistent with these recommendations, more-eroded counties experienced large 
relative declines in the productivity of cropland (column 2) and smaller relative 
declines in the productivity of pasture (column 3).38 On this intensive margin, 
35 The variance-covariance matrix for the three estimates is known, so the efficient average is estimated through 
generalized least squares (regressing the three values on a constant, weighting by the square root of the inverse of 
the variance-covariance matrix). Intuitively, the procedure gives more weight to more-precisely estimated coef-
ficients, and less weight to coefficients that are more correlated with another.
36 Equation (1) is estimated for the value of capital machinery and equipment. From 1930 to 1940, capital 
inputs fell substantially but by less than revenue: 21.2 percent (5.9) in high-erosion counties relative to low-ero-
sion counties, and 9.2 percent (4.2) in medium-erosion counties relative to low-erosion counties. In subsequent 
time periods, for high-erosion relative to low-erosion counties, capital inputs decreased from 1930 by 7.3 percent 
(5.1) in 1945, 16.2 percent (6.8) in 1969, and 15.0 percent (6.9) in 1992. For medium-erosion counties relative to 
low-erosion counties, capital inputs decreased by 0.7 percent (3.6) in 1945, 2.9 percent (4.6) in 1969, and −0.5 
percent (5.0) in 1992. From another estimation of equation (1), fallowed cropland is found to have declined in 
more-eroded counties after 1940, consistent with increased use of inputs leading to a recovery in revenue greater 
than the recovery in rents.
37 The SCS in 1955 continued to recommend converting land from cropland to grassland (Allred and Nixon 
1955).
38 Cropland productivity is defined as the total value of crops sold divided by acres of cropland. Pasture pro-
ductivity is defined as the total value of animals sold and animal products sold, divided by acres of pasture. These 
measures are imperfect proxies for productivity because some portion of a farm’s crops may be fed directly to that 
farm’s animals. The productivity regressions are weighted by 1930 levels of county cropland and pasture, so the 
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more-eroded counties did not experience a substantial relative decline in the alloca-
tion of farmland to crops through the 1930s and 1940s (column 4). By the 1950s and 
1960s, there were moderate relative declines in the allocation of farmland to crops 
in more-eroded counties.
estimates can be interpreted as the percent change for an average unit of that land type. Three additional caveats in 
interpreting the productivity regressions are: (1) changes in productivity need not imply changes in profitability; 
(2) average productivity changes may differ from changes for the marginal unit of land that could be reallocated; 
and (3) later changes in land allocations could confound productivity effects with composition effects.















(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Panel A. High erosion versus low erosion
1940 −0.025 −0.390** −0.224** −0.000 −0.156 0.035
(0.017) (0.120) (0.044) (0.009) (0.115) (0.022)
1945 −0.017 −0.141 −0.116* −0.012 −0.194**
(0.016) (0.074) (0.053) (0.011) (0.070)
1950–1954 −0.037* −0.382** −0.116* −0.030* −0.230** 0.019 0.017
(0.016) (0.068) (0.053) (0.014) (0.068) (0.047) (0.021)
1959–1964 −0.043** −0.333** −0.244** −0.060** −0.214** 0.089* −0.001
(0.016) (0.077) (0.074) (0.017) (0.075) (0.045) (0.022)
1969–1974 −0.013 0.021 0.143** −0.039
(0.015) (0.058) (0.044) (0.025)
1978–1992 −0.050** −0.011 0.210** −0.066*
(0.016) (0.045) (0.046) (0.028)
1997 0.008 0.139* −0.102**
   (0.056) (0.064) (0.032)
Panel B. Medium erosion versus low erosion
1940 −0.019 −0.381** −0.060 −0.003 −0.086 −0.008
(0.013) (0.089) (0.038) (0.006) (0.085) (0.017)
1945 0.004 −0.289** −0.052 −0.008 −0.064
(0.012) (0.062) (0.040) (0.007) (0.049)
1950–1954 −0.008 −0.313** −0.014 −0.018 −0.181** 0.017 −0.002
(0.013) (0.056) (0.041) (0.010) (0.065) (0.045) (0.020)
1959–1964 −0.025 −0.275** 0.006 −0.028* −0.257** 0.041 −0.026
(0.014) (0.068) (0.054) (0.012) (0.062) (0.046) (0.021)
1969–1974 −0.011 −0.039 −0.028 −0.070**
(0.012) (0.044) (0.036) (0.023)
1978–1992 −0.026* −0.064* −0.004 −0.110**
(0.013) (0.033) (0.039) (0.023)
1997 −0.066 −0.016 −0.138**
   (0.050) (0.050) (0.025)
R2 0.656 0.791 0.850 0.679 0.890 0.823 0.435
Sample counties 779 779 779 779 421 421 421
Weighted by 
 1930 value of:
Farmland Cropland Pasture (2) + (3) Wheat Hay (5) + (6)
Notes: Each column reports estimates from equation (1) in the text: farmland per county acre (column 1), log crop 
revenue per cropland acre (column 2), log animal revenue per pasture acre (column 3), cropland per acre of crop-
land and pasture (column 4), log wheat output per wheat acre (column 5), log hay output per hay acre (column 6), 
wheat per acre of wheat and hay (column 7). Reported in parentheses are robust standard errors clustered by county.
** Significant at the 1 percent level.
 * Significant at the 5 percent level.
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Within the allocation of land to crops, contemporaries also recommended that farm-
ers convert eroded cropland from wheat to hay.39 Wheat production is more sensitive 
to soil quality, while hay is cultivated grass and relatively robust. Consistent with con-
temporaries’ recommendations, more-eroded counties experienced a relative decline 
in wheat productivity after the Dust Bowl (column 5), while hay productivity was 
relatively unaffected in later measured periods (column 6).40 The allocation of land 
between wheat and hay, however, was mostly constant through the 1960s in more-
eroded and less-eroded counties, and then wheat cultivation declined substantially rela-
tive to hay cultivation (column 7).41 Overall, the estimates suggest that there were some 
potential margins of adjustment within the agricultural sector, and that adjustments 
along the extensive and intensive margins were mostly delayed for 15 to 30 years.
C. Adjustment in Population, Industry, and the Labor Market
Immediately after the Dust Bowl, population declined substantially in high-erosion 
and medium-erosion counties relative to changes in low-erosion counties (Table 4, 
column 1). By 1940, high-erosion and medium-erosion counties had experienced 
12 percent and 9 percent relative declines in total population. Immediate large-scale 
“Dust Bowl migration” was discussed by contemporaries and famously portrayed in 
literature, film, art, and music. The estimated relative population declines also reflect 
diverted in-migration, however. Further, if all affected migrants moved to low-erosion 
Plains counties, then the estimated relative population declines are twice the implied 
direct effect on migrants. Consistent with large out-migration from 1930 to 1940, total 
population declined between three percent and eight percent in the five central Plains 
states (Oklahoma, Kansas, Nebraska, South Dakota, and North Dakota).
Relative declines in population continued through the 1950s in high-erosion and 
medium-erosion counties (column 1). The decline in population did not occur dis-
proportionally from rural or on-farm populations, suggesting an overall economic 
decline rather than increases in nonagricultural employment.42 There was no sub-
stantial short-run or long-run relative increase in manufacturing establishments 
(column 2) or manufacturing workers per capita (column 3).43 There was relatively 
little initial manufacturing activity or related infrastructure on the Plains, so there 
may have been little basis for subsequent growth and development of manufacturing 
clusters.
39 Contemporaries also recommended converting other soil-sensitive crops to soil-resistant crops, but wheat and 
hay are the two widely grown crops for which comparable data are available over a long time period.
40 Productivity for each crop is defined as the total quantity produced divided by the total acreage harvested. Data 
are unavailable in each period for acreage planted, so crop failure (and no harvesting) would cause the analysis to 
understate declines in productivity. The regressions are weighted by 1930 acres of land allocated to that crop. Data 
are only available for a subset of counties in all reported time periods. The other crop and animal variables are omit-
ted as controls, as they directly change along with wheat and hay.
41 Estimated post-1960s changes in productivity may be affected partly by these changes in the composition of 
lands used for production.
42 From estimating equation (1), there is little relative change in the fraction of county population in rural areas 
or the fraction of county population living on farms. There may be important linkages between local agriculture 
and nonagricultural production and services, and the local nonfarm or urban population may participate directly in 
agriculture (e.g., seasonally).
43 Manufacturing data are unavailable for some of the sample counties. In addition, there is no estimated increase 
in log manufacturing value added or the fraction of manufacturing workers per capita in the labor force.
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Relative population declines appear to have been the main mechanism 
through which equilibrium in the labor market was reestablished. By 1940, the 
unemployment rate was only one percentage point higher in high-erosion counties 
and a statistically insignificant 0.3 percentage points higher in medium-erosion 
counties (column 4). By 1950, unemployment was no longer relatively higher in 
more-eroded counties. Direct data on income or wages is unavailable, but changes 
in per capita retail sales may serve as a proxy for changes in local consump-
tion and earnings (Fishback, Horrace, and Kantor 2005).44 From 1930 to 1940, 
44 Changes in retail sales will differ from changes in wages to the extent that there are changes in net savings or 
labor supply.










Log retail sales 
per capita
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Panel A. High erosion versus low erosion
1940 −0.116** −0.015 0.003 0.010** −0.122**
(0.021) (0.069) (0.002) (0.003) (0.029)
1950 −0.180** −0.183** −0.004
(0.047) (0.067) (0.002)
1960 −0.267** −0.188* 0.005 −0.066*
(0.072) (0.082) (0.007) (0.029)
1970 −0.268** −0.104 0.006 −0.044
(0.088) (0.100) (0.010) (0.037)
1980 −0.250* −0.041 0.013 −0.093*
(0.101) (0.117) (0.013) (0.043)
1990 −0.227* −0.087 0.010 −0.090
(0.114) (0.136) (0.012)  (0.051)
Panel B. Medium erosion versus low erosion
1940 −0.088** −0.100* −0.001 0.003 −0.066**
(0.017) (0.047) (0.002) (0.002) (0.021)
1950 −0.145** −0.084 −0.002
(0.033) (0.046) (0.002)
1960 −0.236** −0.139* 0.005 0.023
(0.054) (0.062) (0.005) (0.021)
1970 −0.246** −0.116 0.012 0.041
(0.070) (0.075) (0.008) (0.026)
1980 −0.251** −0.036 0.018* −0.021
(0.082) (0.092) (0.009) (0.032)
1990 −0.223* −0.026 0.024** −0.013
(0.094) (0.107) (0.008)  (0.039)
R2 0.654 0.637 0.612 0.866 0.998
Sample 
 counties
779 516 287 779 758
Notes: Each column reports estimates from equation (1) in the text for the indicated outcome 
variable. In columns 2, 3, and 5, manufacturing and retail data are combined with population 
data from the nearest decade and the estimated coefficients are pooled over the following years: 
1945 and 1954 for 1950; 1959 and 1964 for 1960; 1969 and 1974 for 1970; 1978 and 1982 
for 1980; 1987 and 1992 for 1990. All regressions are weighted by county population in 1930. 
Reported in parentheses are robust standard errors clustered by county.
** Significant at the 1 percent level.
 * Significant at the 5 percent level.
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per capita retail sales declined by 12.2 percent and 6.6 percent in high-erosion 
and medium-erosion counties (column 5). Assuming a value of −0.3 to −0.6 for 
the elasticity of labor demand (Borjas 2003), the estimated relative population 
declines in a high-erosion county from 1940 to 1960 predict a 4.5 percent to six 
percent increase in wages and a 9.7 percent increase in income, compared to the 
estimated 5.6 percent recovery in per capita retail sales from 1940 to 1958.45 In 
a medium-erosion county, the relative population declines predict a 4.4 percent 
to 5.9 percent increase in wages and a 9.5 percent increase in income, compared 
to the estimated 8.9 percent recovery in per capita retail sales. The population 
declines are of approximately the correct magnitude to explain observed labor 
market recovery through supply-side declines and no increase in labor demand. 
This pattern of results is similar to estimates by Blanchard and Katz (1992) for the 
United States in the second half of the twentieth century; in response to a nega-
tive shock, adjustment took place through relative population declines rather than 
increased industry.
D. Potential Factors Contributing to Slow Agricultural Adjustment
After the Dust Bowl, there was limited and slow adjustment within the agricultural 
sector; instead, relative population declines were the main margin of adjustment. 
Contemporaries discussed four main factors that may have discouraged agricultural 
adjustment, described in Section I: access to capital, small farm sizes, farm tenancy, 
and surplus labor. This section explores the potential role of these four factors, in 
addition to government agricultural policies.
Restricted access to capital may have constrained farmers’ ability to adjust agri-
cultural production. Indeed, high-erosion counties lost access to more banks dur-
ing the 1930s than low-erosion or medium-erosion counties (Appendix Figure 2).46 
Even when banks remained open, decreased deposits and local economic weakness 
may have restricted banks’ ability to lend. Bank weakness and bank failures can lead 
to persistent decreases in the local supply of credit (Bernanke 1983; Calomiris and 
Mason 2003; Ashcraft 2005), particularly in this era when banks were small and 
lent locally. Land-owning farmers also lost potential collateral when land values 
decreased substantially in more-eroded counties. Access to capital may have been 
restricted during the Great Depression, despite substantial compensatory efforts 
by the Farm Credit Administration and Farm Security Administration (Fishback, 
Kantor, and Wallis 2003).
To estimate the impact of factors that may affect agricultural adjustment, equa-
tion (1) is modified to examine heterogeneity in the response of different counties 
to erosion. Differences during the 1930s, such as bank failures or government credit 
programs, are potentially affected by the Dust Bowl; instead, the analysis focuses on 
variation in baseline county characteristics. Equation (2) includes interaction terms 
45 Estimates from Borjas (2003) imply that a ten percent decrease in population would increase wages by three 
percent to four percent, or increase income by 6.4 percent once individuals’ labor supply adjusts.
46 These estimates are from an annual version of equation (1), reporting annual residual differences by erosion 
level for the log number of banks open at the end of each year. Bank deposits experienced a similar decline in high-
erosion counties.
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between the log number of banks in 1928 (B) and the fraction of a county in high-
erosion and medium-erosion areas:
(2)  Y ct −  Y c1930 =  β 1t  M c +  β 2t  H c +  β 3t  B c 
 +  β 4t  B c ×  M c +  β 5t  B c ×  H c 
 +  α st +  θ t  X c +  γ 1t  L c +  γ 2t  B c ×  L c +  ϵ ct .
The coefficient  β 5t reports whether high-erosion counties changed differently than 
low-erosion counties when there were more banks, compared to the difference in 
changes between high-erosion counties and low-erosion counties when there were 
fewer banks (and  β 4t for medium-erosion counties). Equation (2) controls for the 
main effect of banks and interactions between banks and lags of the county out-
come. For ease of interpretation across different baseline characteristics, B is nor-
malized to have a standard deviation of one.
The identification assumption is that counties with more banks in 1928 maintained 
better access to capital through the Dust Bowl, but otherwise would have made similar 
adjustments in agricultural land use. Estimates of  β 4t and  β 5t should be interpreted cau-
tiously because it is a strong assumption that other county characteristics are not cor-
related with both the number of banks and counties’ differential responses to erosion.
Table 5, column 1, reports that more-eroded counties with more banks immedi-
ately shifted land from cropland to pasture. In contrast, there was no difference in 
shifting land from wheat to hay (column 2). Livestock may require greater upfront 
capital expenditure than shifting between wheat and hay machinery, but the esti-
mates may also reflect mixed support for the capital constraints hypothesis.47
Changing agricultural land use in a county may have required the reorganization 
of land ownership. Erosion-resistant activities, such as pasture and hay, are associ-
ated with a larger scale of production. After 1940, farm sizes generally increased on 
the Plains and there is some evidence of relative increases in more-eroded counties.48 
Tenants’ incentives for short-term production may have discouraged land-use adjust-
ment, though land owners often coordinate with tenants on inputs and crop choices 
(see, e.g., Alston and Higgs 1982, and Reid 1977).49 After 1940, the fraction of farm-
land operated by tenants declined in aggregate and in more-eroded counties.50 Farm 
size increases and declines in tenancy may have encouraged later land-use adjust-
ments, though there is little evidence that areas with larger farm sizes or fewer ten-
ants were able to adjust land use more immediately. Columns 3 to 6 (Table 5) report 
estimates from a version of equation (2) that replaces the number of banks with the 
47 Greater bank deposits also predict more adjustment from cropland to pasture, though these effects are margin-
ally statistically insignificant until 1950.
48 From estimating equation (1), farm sizes increased five percent to nine percent in high-erosion counties and 
were relatively unchanged in medium-erosion counties, relative to changes in low-erosion counties.
49 Using data from 1930, 1940, and 1950, equation (1) can be estimated separately for tenants and nontenants 
and there is little evidence for slower land-use adjustment among tenants. There is some evidence for faster land-use 
adjustment among tenants, though changes in land tenancy make these estimates difficult to interpret.
50 From estimating equation (1), land tenancy shares declined from 1940 to 1960 by seven percentage points in 
high-erosion counties and three percentage points in medium-erosion counties, relative to changes in low-erosion 
counties. From 1930 to 1940, land tenancy had increased relatively by five percentage points in high-erosion coun-
ties and two percentage points in low-erosion counties.
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average size of farms (columns 3 and 4) or the tenant share of farmland (columns 
5 and 6).
Surplus agricultural labor and temporarily lower wages may have discouraged faster 
land-use adjustment in more-eroded counties, as cropland and wheat are more labor-
intensive than pasture and hay. Agricultural land use shifted toward less labor-intensive 
activities after relative population declines had ceased. Consistent with lower agricul-
tural wages (or capital constraints), more-eroded counties experienced an immediate 
relative increase in the agricultural labor-to-capital ratio.51 There is no evidence, how-
ever, of more immediate land-use adjustment among more-eroded counties with ini-
tially fewer people living on farms per acre of farmland (Table 5, columns 7 and 8).
51 Equation (1) is estimated for log number of people living on farms per dollar invested in equipment and 
machinery on farms. In high-erosion counties, the ratio increased temporarily after 1930: 15.3 percent (4.8) by 
1940, 1.2 percent (4.4) by 1945, and 7.8 percent (4.7) by 1969. In medium-erosion counties the ratio increased 
temporarily after 1930: 11.1 percent (3.9) by 1940, 2.0 percent (3.6) by 1945, and 4.9 percent (3.9) by 1969.
Table 5 —Estimated Changes in Agricultural Land Use after 1930,  
Interacted with County Precharacteristics

























(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Panel A. High erosion versus low erosion
1940 −0.043** 0.026 0.025* −0.010 0.018 0.008 0.030** −0.005
(0.015) (0.019) (0.011) (0.017) (0.009) (0.017) (0.011) (0.018)
1945 −0.038* 0.014 0.006 0.021
(0.017) (0.014) (0.011) (0.014)
1950–1954 −0.056** 0.007 0.034* −0.034 0.019 −0.057** 0.040* −0.034
(0.019) (0.021) (0.017) (0.020) (0.015) (0.019) (0.016) (0.020)
1959–1964 −0.058** 0.016 0.027 −0.008 0.018 −0.033 0.037 −0.006
(0.021) (0.022) (0.020) (0.023) (0.017) (0.023) (0.019) (0.022)
Panel B. Medium erosion versus low erosion
1940 −0.019** −0.010 0.010 0.020 0.009 0.012 0.013 0.024
(0.006) (0.012) (0.007) (0.014) (0.007) (0.013) (0.007) (0.014)
1945 −0.019** 0.004 −0.005 0.005
(0.007) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008)
1950–1954 −0.011 −0.002 0.000 −0.027 −0.015 −0.052** 0.002 −0.021
(0.009) (0.017) (0.012) (0.018) (0.012) (0.016) (0.012) (0.017)
1959–1964 −0.015 0.002 0.006 −0.021 −0.020 −0.055** 0.007 −0.009
(0.011) (0.017) (0.015) (0.019) (0.016) (0.017) (0.015) (0.019)
R2 0.695 0.468 0.688 0.472 0.689 0.491 0.689 0.480
Sample  
 counties






+ Hay Cropland + Pasture
Wheat 







Notes: Each column reports estimates from equation (2) in the text for the indicated outcome variable. For col-
umns 1 and 2, the interaction term is the log number of banks at the end of 1928. For columns 3 and 4, the inter-
action term is the log average farm size in 1930. For columns 5 and 6, the interaction term is the tenant share of 
farmland in 1930. For columns 7 and 8 the interaction term is the log farm population per acre of farmland in 
1930. All interaction terms are normalized to have mean zero and standard deviation of one (negative one for col-
umns 5–8). Reported in parentheses are robust standard errors clustered by county.
** Significant at the 1 percent level.
 * Significant at the 5 percent level.
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The government intervened substantially in agricultural markets during the 1930s 
and after, and some of these policies may have discouraged agricultural adjustment. 
Crop payments and price supports encouraged continued farming, though some con-
servation payments and crop acreage restrictions discouraged wheat and cropland in 
favor of pasture and hay. Government programs provided direct relief, payments for 
crop reductions, farm and housing credit, and public works employment, but there is no 
evidence of differential 1930s New Deal payments to more-eroded counties (Table 6). 
In the 1990s, more-eroded counties received greater payments from the Conservation 
Reserve Program (CRP) to take damaged lands out of production (precluding other 
agricultural payments). Estimated higher take-up of the CRP is consistent with more-
eroded counties persisting in the agricultural use of lower-quality damaged farmland.
Dust Bowl erosion affected agriculture across a wide range of Plains counties, 
which included a variety of agricultural enterprises. When splitting the main analy-
sis into more homogeneous subsamples of counties, more-eroded areas generally 
experience large land value declines, persistent agricultural costs, limited adjust-
ment in agricultural production, and population declines.52 This subsample analysis 
52 The regressions were estimated separately on 12 subsamples of counties that were above or below the median 
of six different county characteristics in 1930: acres of cropland per acre of farmland; acres of corn per acre of 
Table 6—Estimated Differences in Government Payments per Farm Acre, by Erosion Level









(1) (2) (3) (4)
Panel A. New Deal payments (1933–39)
AAA payments 0.459 0.012 −0.030 −0.042*
[0.325] (0.016) (0.022) (0.021)
Public works spending 0.229 0.019 −0.055 −0.074
[0.568] (0.049) (0.060) (0.061)
Relief spending 0.426 0.099 0.167 0.068
[2.167] (0.075) (0.107) (0.091)
New Deal loans 0.446 −0.058 −0.037 0.021
[1.094] (0.080) (0.095) (0.080)
Mortgage loans guaranteed 0.112 0.018 −0.067 −0.085*
[0.801] (0.033) (0.050) (0.039)
Panel B. Government payments in 1992
Conservation Reserve Program 1.430 0.713** 1.333** 0.619**
[1.298] (0.140) (0.226) (0.211)
All government payments 6.659 −0.666 −1.655** −0.989*
[5.206] (0.408) (0.507) (0.464)
Fraction of payments through CRP 0.248 0.065** 0.162** 0.096**
[0.158] (0.020) (0.027) (0.024)
Notes: Panel A reports differences in 1930’s New Deal spending across 776 counties. Panel B reports differences 
in conservation reserve program (CRP) payments in 1992, all government payments in 1992, and the fraction of 
payments through the CRP in 1992. Column 1 reports the mean and standard deviation in brackets. Column 2 (col-
umn 3) reports the average difference for medium-erosion counties (high-erosion counties) relative to low-erosion 
counties, controlling for state fixed effects and county characteristics in panels B–E of Table 1, and lagged values of 
the characteristics. Column 4 reports the difference in coefficients between columns 2 and 3. The means and regres-
sions are weighted by county farmland in 1930. Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses.
** Significant at the 1 percent level.
 * Significant at the 5 percent level.
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is consistent with estimates from equation (2), as there do not appear to be clear 
agricultural characteristics that enabled more-eroded counties to mitigate quickly 
the impacts of Dust Bowl erosion.
VI. Conclusion
The 1930s American Dust Bowl imposed substantial agricultural costs in more-
eroded Plains counties, relative to less-eroded Plains counties. From 1930 to 1940, 
more-eroded counties experienced large and permanent relative declines in agri-
cultural land values: the per acre value of farmland declined by 30 percent in high-
erosion counties and declined by 17 percent in medium-erosion counties, relative to 
changes in low-erosion counties. It is difficult to quantify the aggregate cost of the 
Dust Bowl, however, as declines in productive farmland may have increased land 
values in low-erosion counties.
Relative adjustments in agricultural land use were slow and limited, despite the 
availability of productive land-use adjustments recommended by contemporary 
state agricultural experiment stations and extension services. Consistent with these 
contemporaries’ hypotheses, credit constraints may have limited agricultural adjust-
ment. More-eroded counties had greater declines in access to credit during the 1930s 
and there was greater land-use adjustment in more-eroded counties that had more 
banks prior to the 1930s. There is more limited evidence that land-use adjustment 
was slowed by contemporaries’ other hypothesized explanations (small farm sizes, 
land tenancy, or farm labor surpluses). Estimated relative changes in land values and 
revenues imply that agricultural adjustments recovered less than 25 percent of the 
initial relative cost in more-eroded counties.
The main margin of economic adjustment was large relative population declines 
in more-eroded counties. From 1930 to 1940, populations declined by 12 percent in 
high-erosion counties and declined by 9 percent in medium-erosion counties, rela-
tive to changes in low-erosion counties. These estimates are consistent with historical 
accounts of substantial out-migration, though the estimated relative population declines 
overstate out-migration to the extent that migrants moved to low-erosion counties. The 
Great Depression may have limited outside employment opportunities and, by 1940, 
population adjustment remained incomplete: unemployment was higher, a proxy for 
wages was lower, and the labor-capital ratio in agriculture was higher. These indica-
tors recovered as large relative population declines continued through the 1950s.
The Dust Bowl provides a detailed context in which to examine economic adjust-
ment to a permanent change in environmental conditions. The Great Depression 
may have slowed adjustment by limiting access to capital or outside employment 
opportunities. Agricultural adjustment continued to be slow, however, through the 
1940s and 1950s. Further research on historical shocks may help understand what 
conditions facilitate long-run economic adjustment. The experience of the American 
Dust Bowl highlights that agricultural costs from environmental destruction need 
not be mitigated mostly by agricultural adjustments, and that economic adjustment 
may require a substantial relative decline in population.
cropland; acres of wheat per acre of cropland; number of cows per county acre; acres of farmland per farm; and 
number of people on farms per acre of farmland.
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Data Appendix
Variable Definitions and Available Years of Data: 
County Acres. Acres in each county, held fixed at 1910 borders.
Farmland. Acres of land in farms, including: cropland, pasture, woodland not used 
for pasture, and a small category of “other.” 1910, 1920, 1925, 1930, 1940, 1945, 
1950, 1954, 1959, 1964, 1969, 1974, 1978, 1982, 1987, 1992.
Cropland. Acres of cropland: cropland harvested, failed cropland, fallow land. 
1925–1974.
Pasture. Acres of pasture, including land used for pasture that could be used for 
crops without further improvement. 1925–1964.
Wheat Land. Harvested acres of wheat, prior year. 1910–1997 (restricted sample).
Hay Land. Harvested acres of hay, prior year. 1910–1997, except 1945 (restricted 
sample).
Other Crops. Harvested acres of cotton and oats/barley/rye, included as controls 
for 1925 and 1930 (missing values are treated as zeros).
Cattle, Swine, Chickens. Number of cattle and swine in 1910–1930, number of 
chickens in 1920–1930.
Land Value. The value of farmland, including buildings and improvements attached 
to the land (excluding implements and machinery). 1910–1992, except 1974. 
Data include the average value of a farm and the average value of a farm acre (the 
two begin to differ slightly after 1950, when the census began to sample farms). 
Total values are calculated from each measure, and the average of the two is used 
(oversampling large farms will tend to bias the averages in opposite directions). 
Results are not sensitive to using either measure. The value of land only (not 
including buildings) is available in 1910, 1920, 1930, and 1940.
Revenue. Crop revenue and animal revenue. 1910–1992, except 1974.
Crop Revenue. Value of all crops sold, prior year. 1910–1964.
Animal Revenue. Value of all animal products sold and animals sold, prior year. 
1910–1964. From 1920 to 1930, animal revenue is not directly reported but the 
total value of animals is reported. The ratio of animal revenue to total value of 
animals is calculated for each county in 1910 and 1940 and used to impute animal 
revenue from 1920 to 1930. Results are not sensitive to using the revenue/stock 
ratio in 1910 or 1940. Reported estimates use a weighted average (1910 ratio 
weighted two-thirds in 1920, one-half in 1925, one-third in 1930). When the rev-
enue/stock ratio is unavailable in 1910, the ratio is used from 1940.
Wheat Output. Bushels of wheat harvested, prior year. 1910–1997.
Hay Output. Tons of hay harvested, prior year. 1910–1997, except 1940–1945.
Agricultural Capital. Market value of machinery and equipment used on the farm, 
regardless of owner. 1910–1945, 1969, 1992.
Population. Total population. 1910, 1920, 1930, 1940, 1950, 1960, 1970, 1990, 
2000.
Rural Population. Population living in areas with fewer than 2,500 inhabitants. 
1910–1970.
Farm Population. Population living on farms. 1930, 1940, 1945, 1950, 1970, 1990.
Number of Farms. 1910–1992.
Retail Sales per capita. Sales in the retail sector. 1930, 1940, 1958, 1967, 1987.
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Labor Force. Workers employed, laid off without pay (excluding sick or idle), or 
unemployed and searching for a job. 1930, 1940, 1950.
unemployed. Workers unemployed or laid off. 1930, 1940, 1950.
Manufacturing Workers. 1920, 1930, 1940, 1958, 1967, 1987.
Manufacturing Establishments. 1920–1992, except 1950.
Number of Banks. Number of active banks at year end. 1920–1936, annually.
Tenant Farmland. Farmland share operated by tenants. 1910–1992, except 1954 
and 1960.
Results Appendix
There is no direct measure of erosion levels prior to the 1930s, as detailed erosion 
surveys were funded in response to the Dust Bowl. The main empirical analysis uses 
cumulative post-1930s erosion damage as a proxy for differential erosion during the 
1930s, and the control variables in equation (1) are intended to proxy for any cor-
relation between pre-1930s erosion and later changes in the outcome variable.
In the absence of sufficient control variables, an empirical concern is that areas 
with high-erosion and medium-erosion by the 1920s may have experienced a sub-
stantial land value decline in the 1930s even if the Dust Bowl had not occurred. The 
cumulative erosion map in Figure 2 was prepared by the Soil Conservation Service 
for the entire country, and many areas outside these Dust Bowl states were classified 
as being high-erosion or medium-erosion. Counties in other states were not directly 
eroded by the Dust Bowl and so much of this high erosion and medium erosion is 
more likely to reflect higher erosion levels by the 1920s. Restricting the analysis 
to these non-Dust Bowl states, a falsification exercise compares changes in the log 
value of agricultural land per acre of farmland in high-erosion and medium-erosion 
counties, relative to changes in low-erosion counties in the same state.
The dashed line in Figure A1, panel A, graphs the estimated relative differences 
in land values between high-erosion and low-erosion counties in non-Dust Bowl 
states. By comparison, the solid line graphs the estimated relative differences 
in land values between high-erosion and low-erosion counties in the Dust Bowl 
sample states (from Figure 3, panel A). Panel B graphs the relative differences 
between medium-erosion and low-erosion counties. From 1930 to 1940, relative 
land values declined more sharply in Dust Bowl states than in non-Dust Bowl 
states, as counties with baseline erosion differences changed similarly in non-Dust 
Bowl states. Prior to 1930, more-eroded counties had relatively higher land values 
in Dust Bowl states compared to the relative differences in non-Dust Bowl states, 
consistent with more of the measured post-1930s erosion having not yet occurred 
in Dust Bowl states.
In another specification check, instrumenting for post-1930s erosion levels may 
focus the empirical analysis on variation in erosion that occurred during the 1930s. 
Dust Bowl erosion was partly caused by severe drought during the 1930s, which 
is the worst recorded drought on the Plains. Appendix Table 1 reports estimates 
from regressing the fraction of a county in high erosion (column 1) and medium 
erosion (column 2) on: the number of months during the 1930s that a county 
was in extreme drought, severe drought, and moderate drought; the average 1930s 
drought level; the average annual 1930s temperature; and the standard deviation of 
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temperatures in the 1930s.53 The specifications control for the same drought and 
temperature variables from 1895 to 1929, to adjust for average climate differences 
among counties.
53 The specifications control for the same variables as in equation (1). Drought is measured by the Palmer 
Drought Severity Index (PDSI), and extreme/severe/moderate drought reflects conventional cutoffs in the PDSI. 
High and extreme temperatures contribute to drought, crop failure, and erosion on bare farmland. Data were col-
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Figure A1. Estimated Differences by Erosion Level in Log Value of Farmland:  
Dust Bowl vs. Non-Dust Bowl States
Notes: The solid line in both panels corresponds to estimated within-state differences by erosion level in the log value 
of agricultural land and buildings per acre of farmland (from panel A of Figure 3), for the 779 sample counties in 
Figure 2. The dashed line in both panels corresponds to estimated within-state differences by erosion level for 1,848 
counties in other US states (not those depicted in Figure 2). Panel A reports the difference between high-erosion and 
medium-erosion counties; panel B reports the difference between medium-erosion and low-erosion counties.
Figure A2. Estimated Differences in Log Number of Local Banks at Year End, by Erosion Level
Notes: This figure graphs the estimated coefficients (β) from a modified version of equation (1), described in panel 
C of Figure 3. Bank data are available annually, so the regression controls for state-by-year fixed effects and county 
characteristics interacted with every year.
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Months of extreme drought, average drought, and temperature extremes during 
the 1930s are predictive of high erosion, while months of less extreme drought 
are also predictive of medium erosion. These estimates suggest that a meaningful 
portion of measured post-1930s erosion levels reflect erosion that took place dur-
ing the 1930s.
Interpreting these first-stage estimates requires weather shocks to be random, but 
interpreting 2SLS estimates requires a stronger assumption that 1930s weather only 
affects changes in the outcome variable through its impacts on erosion. Temporary 
weather shocks may have some direct effects on changes in land values from 1930 
to 1940, but this exclusion restriction is especially likely to fail for other county out-
comes (e.g., population, capital investments, or even revenue). Column 3 reports the 
2SLS estimates and column 4 reports OLS estimates for the same sample and control 
variables. When instrumenting for erosion levels, high-erosion counties experienced 
a much larger relative decline in land values and medium-erosion counties experi-
enced an imprecise similar relative decline, compared to changes in low-erosion 
Table A1—Estimated Effects of 1930s Weather on Erosion,  
and Instrumental Variables Estimates for Changes in Land Values from 1930 to 1940











Panel A. Erosion level
 High-erosion versus low-erosion −0.996** −0.312**
(0.229) (0.037)
 Medium-erosion versus low-erosion −0.137 −0.175**
 (0.175) (0.031)
Panel B. Weather instruments
Months in extreme drought, 1930s 0.0070** 0.0056*
(0.0018) (0.0028)
Months in severe drought, 1930s 0.0020 0.0085**
(0.0015) (0.0023)
Months in moderate drought, 1930s 0.0001 0.0038
(0.0016) (0.0024)
Average Palmer Drought Severity, 1930s 0.0897** 0.1640**
(0.0313) (0.0578)
Average annual temperature, 1930s −0.0277 0.0957*
(0.0254) (0.0413)
Temperature standard deviation, 1930s 0.1209* 0.1424
(0.0518) (0.0863)
F-stat: Instruments 8.376 52.77
p-value: Instruments = 0 0.0002 0.0000
Sample counties 776 776 776 776
Notes: Column 1 reports first-stage estimates from regressing the fraction of a county in high-erosion areas on the 
1930s weather instruments, controlling for the same weather variables from 1895–1929 and the county controls 
included in Table 2. Column 2 reports analogous estimates for the fraction of a county in medium-erosion areas. 
Column 3 reports two-stage least squares estimates of the relative change in land values by erosion level, control-
ling for the variables in columns 1 and 2 and instrumenting for erosion levels with the 1930s weather instruments. 
Column 4 reports OLS estimates (as in Table 2), with the same controls and sample as column 3. Robust standard 
errors are reported in parentheses.
** Significant at the 1 percent level.
 * Significant at the 5 percent level.
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counties.54 The implied reduced-form results have a more cautious interpretation: 
1930s weather appears to predict higher erosion and declining land values. These 
estimates are consistent with higher measured erosion levels partly reflecting the 
1930s Dust Bowl and causing persistent agricultural costs.
REFERENCES
Allred, B. W., and W. M. Nixon. 1955. “Grass for Conservation in the Southern Great Plains.” United 
States Department of Agriculture Farmer’s Bulletin 2093.
Alston, Lee J., and Robert Higgs. 1982. “Contractual Mix in Southern Agriculture since the Civil War: 
Facts, Hypotheses, and Tests.” Journal of Economic History 42 (2): 327–53.
Ashcraft, Adam B. 2005. “Are Banks Really Special? New Evidence from FDIC-Induced Failures of 
Healthy Banks.” American Economic Review 95 (5): 1712–30.
Bernanke, Ben S. 1983. “Nonmonetary Effects of the Financial Crisis in the Propagation of the Great 
Depression.” American Economic Review 73 (3): 257–76.
Blanchard, Olivier J., and Lawrence F. Katz. 1992. “Regional Evolutions.” Brookings Papers on Eco-
nomic Activity 1992 (1): 1–75.
Bloom, Nick, Stephen Bond, and John Van Reenen. 2007. “Uncertainty and Investment Dynamics.” 
Review of Economic Studies 74 (2): 391–415.
Borjas, George J. 2003. “The Labor Demand Curve Is Downward Sloping: Reexamining the Impact of 
Immigration on the Labor Market.” Quarterly Journal of Economics 118 (4):1335–74.
Boustan, Leah P., Price V. Fishback, and Shawn E. Kantor. 2010. “The Effect of Internal Migration on 
Local Labor Markets: American Cities During the Great Depression.” Journal of Labor Econom-
ics 28 (4): 719–46.
Bresnahan, Timothy, and Valerie A. Ramey. 1993. “Segment Shifts and Capacity Utilization in the 
U.S. Automobile Industry.” American Economic Review 83 (2): 213–18.
Calomiris, Charles W., and Joseph R. Mason. 2003. “Consequences of Bank Distress during the Great 
Depression.” American Economic Review 93 (3): 937–47.
Carrington, William J. 1996. “The Alaskan Labor Market during the Pipeline Era.” Journal of Politi-
cal Economy 104 (1): 186–218.
Carter, Susan B., Scott Sigmund Gartner, Michael R. Haines, Alan L. Olmstead, Richard Sutch, and 
Gavin Wright, eds. 2006. Historical Statistics of the united States. http://hsus.cambridge.org.
Chari, V. V., and Hugo Hopenhayn. 1991. “Vintage Human Capital, Growth, and the Diffusion of New 
Technology.” Journal of Political Economy 99 (6): 1142–65.
Chetty, Raj, John Friedman, Tore Olsen, and Luigi Pistaferri. 2011. “Adjustment Costs, Firm 
Responses, and Labor Supply Elasticities: Evidence from Denmark.” Quarterly Journal of Eco-
nomics 126 (2): 749–804.
Collins, William J., and Robert A. Margo. 2007. “The Economic Aftermath of the 1960s Riots in 
American Cities: Evidence from Property Values.” Journal of Economic History 67 (4): 849–83.
Conley, Timothy G. 1999. “GMM Estimation with Cross-Sectional Dependence.” Journal of Econo-
metrics 92 (1): 1–45.
Cunfer, Geoff. 2005. On the Great Plains: Agriculture and Environment. College Station, TX: Texas 
A&M Press.
Cutler, David M., Grant Miller, and Douglas M. Norton. 2007. “Evidence on Early-Life Income and 
Late-Life Health from America’s Dust Bowl Era.” Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences 
104 (33): 13244–49.
Davis, Donald R., and David E. Weinstein. 2002. “Bones, Bombs, and Break Points: The Geography of 
Economic Activity.” American Economic Review 92 (5): 1269–89.
Dell, Melissa, Benjamin F. Jones, and Benjamin A. Olken. Forthcoming. “Temperature Shocks and 
Economic Growth: Evidence from the Last Half Century.” American Economic Journal: Macro-
economics.
Deschenes, Olivier, and Michael Greenstone. 2007. “The Economic Impacts of Climate Change: Evi-
dence from Agricultural Output and Random Fluctuations in Weather.” American Economic Review 
97 (1): 354–85.
54 The OLS estimates may be positively biased if lands becoming more valuable were farmed intensely during 
the 1930s and this caused greater erosion; the OLS estimates may be negatively biased if lands becoming less valu-
able were not protected from erosion. The OLS estimates may also be attenuated by measurement error in erosion.
1506 THE AMERICAN ECONOMIC REVIEW juNE 2012
Dixit, Avinash, and Robert Pindyck. 1994. Investment under uncertainty. Princeton, NJ: Princeton 
Press.
Duflo, Esther. 2004. “The Medium-Run Effects of Educational Expansion: Evidence from a Large 
School Construction Program in Indonesia.” journal of Development Economics 74 (1): 163–97.
Fishback, Price V., Shawn Kantor, and John Joseph Wallis. 2003. “Can the New Deal’s Three Rs Be 
Rehabilitated? A Program-by-Program, County-by-County Analysis.” Explorations in Economic 
History 40 (3): 278–307.
Fishback, Price V., William C. Horrace, and Shawn Kantor. 2005. “Did New Deal Grant Programs 
Stimulate Local Economies? A Study of Federal Grants and Retail Sales During the Great Depres-
sion.” journal of Economic History 65 (1): 36–71.
Foster, Andrew D., and Mark R. Rosenzweig. 1995. “Learning by Doing and Learning from Others: 
Human Capital and Technical Change in Agriculture.” journal of Political Economy 103 (6): 1176–
1209.
Grant, M. J. 2002. Down and Out on the Family Farm: Rural Rehabilitation in the Great Plains, 1929–
1945. Lincoln, NE: University of Nebraska Press.
Griliches, Zvi. 1957. “Hybrid Corn: An Exploration in the Economics of Technical Change.” Econo-
metrica 25 (4): 501–22.
Guiteras, Raymond. 2009. “The Impact of Climate Change on Indian Agriculture.” http://www.econ.
umd.edu/research/papers/34/download/300.
Gutmann, Myron. 2005. Great Plains Population and Environment Data: Agricultural Data: 1870–
1997. http://dx.doi.org/10.3886/ICPSR04254.v1.
Haines, Michael R. 2005. Historical, Demographic, Economic, and Social Data: The united States, 
1790–2000. http://sodapop.pop.psu.edu/data-collections/hdes.
Hansen, Zeynep K. 2005. “On the Great Plains by Geoff Cunfer.” journal of Economic History 65 (4): 
1162–63.
Hansen, Zeynep K., and Gary D. Libecap. 2004. “Small Farms, Externalities, and the Dust Bowl of the 
1930s.” journal of Political Economy 112 (3): 665–94.
Hornbeck, Richard. 2012. “The Enduring Impact of the American Dust Bowl: Short- and Long-
Run Adjustments to Environmental Catastrophe: Dataset.” American Economic Review. http://
dx.doi=10.1257/aer.102.4.1477.
Hornbeck, Richard. 2010. “Barbed Wire: Property Rights and Agricultural Development.” Quarterly 
journal of Economics 125 (2): 767–810.
Hoyt, J. 1936. “Droughts of 1930–1934.” US Geological Survey Water-Supply Paper 680.
Hughes, H. D., and L. J. Thorp. 1940. “Putting New Life Into Pastures.” Farm Science Reporter 1 (1): 
3–6.
Hurt, Douglas R. 1981. The Dust Bowl: An Agricultural and Social History. Chicago: Rowman & Lit-
tlefield.
Leuchtenburg, William E. 1963. Franklin D. Roosevelt and the New Deal, 1932–1940. New York: 
Harper and Row.
Margo, Robert A. 1997. “Wages in California during the Gold Rush.” National Bureau of Economic 
Research Historical Working Paper 101.
McDonald, Angus. 1938. Erosion and Its Control in Oklahoma Territory. Washington, DC: United 
States Department of Agriculture.
Mendelsohn, Robert, William D. Nordhaus, and Daigee Shaw. 1994. “The Impact of Global Warming 
on Agriculture: A Ricardian Analysis.” American Economic Review 84 (4): 753–71.
Miguel, Edward, and Gerard Roland. 2011. “The Long-Run Impact of Bombing Vietnam.” journal of 
Development Economics 96 (1): 1–15.
Nelson, Enoch Wesley, and Weldon Owen Shepherd. 1940. “Restoring Colorado’s Range and Aban-
doned Croplands.” Colorado State College Colorado Experiment Station Bulletin 459.
Olmstead, Alan L., and Paul Rhode. 2011. “Adapting North American Wheat Production to Climatic 
Challenges, 1839–2009.” Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences 108 (2): 480–85.
Phillips, Sarah. 2007. This Land, This Nation. New York: Cambridge University Press.
Pine, Wilfred H. 1942. “Area Analysis and Agricultural Adjustments in Nemaha County, Kansas.” 
Kansas State College of Agriculture and Applied Science Agricultural Experiment Station Bulle-
tin 305.
Rasmussen, Wayne David. 1979. “Price-Support and Adjustment Programs From 1933 Through 1978: 
A Short History.” Department of Agriculture Agricultural Info Bulletin 424.
Redding, Stephen J., and Daniel M. Sturm. 2008. “The Costs of Remoteness: Evidence from German 
Division and Reunification.” American Economic Review 98 (5): 1766–97.
Reid, Joseph D. 1977. “The Theory of Share Tenancy Revisited—Again.” journal of Political Econ-
omy 85 (2): 403–07.
1507HORNBECk: THE ENDuRING IMPACT OF THE AMERICAN DuST BOWLVOL. 102 NO. 4
Renne, Roland R. 1936. “Montana Land Ownership: An Analysis of the Ownership Pattern and Its 
Significance in Land Use Planning.” Montana State College Agricultural Experiment Station Bul-
letin 322.
Roback, Jennifer. 1982. “Wages, Rents, and the Quality of Life.” Journal of Political Economy 90 (6): 
1257–78.
Rosenzweig, Mark R., and Kenneth I. Wolpin. 2000. “Natural ‘Natural Experiments’ in Economics.” 
Journal of Economic Literature 38 (4): 827–74.
Saloutos, Theodore. 1982. The American Farmer and the New Deal. Ames, IA: Iowa State Press.
Schickele, Rainer, John P. Himmel, and Iowa Agricultural Experiment Station. 1936. “Problems of 
Land Tenure in Relation to Land-Use Adjustments.” Resettlement Administration Land Utilization 
Division and Iowa Agricultural Experiment Station, Land-Use Planning Publication 9.
Schlenker, Wolfram, W. Michael Hanemann, and Anthony C. Fisher. 2006. “The Impact of Global 
Warming on U.S. Agriculture: An Econometric Analysis of Optimal Growing Conditions.” Review 
of Economics and Statistics 88 (1): 113–25.
Schlenker, Wolfram, and Michael J. Roberts. 2009. “Nonlinear Temperature Effects Indicate Severe 
Damages to U.S. Crop Yields under Climate Change.” Proceedings of the National Academy of Sci-
ences 106 (37): 15594–98.
Soil Conservation Service (SCS). 1935. Soil Erosion: A Critical Problem in American Agriculture. 
Washington, DC: Government Printing Office.
SCS. 1936. Soil Conservation—Its Place in National Agricultural Policy. Washington, DC: Govern-
ment Printing Office.
SCS. 1939. Report of the Chief of the Soil Conservation Service. Washington, DC: Government Print-
ing Office.
SCS. 1941. Report of the Chief of the Soil Conservation Service. Washington, DC: Government Print-
ing Office.
SCS. 1955. “Facts About Wind Erosion and Dust Storms on the Great Plains.” United States Depart-
ment of Agriculture Leaflet 394.
Sutch, Richard. 2010. “The Impact of the 1936 Corn Belt Drought on American Farmers’ Adoption of 
Hybrid Corn.” In The Economics of Climate Change: Adaptations Past and Present, edited by Gary 
D. Libecap and Richard H. Steckel, 195–223. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
United States Department of Agriculture (USDA). 1924. Atlas of Agriculture, Part I, Section E. Wash-
ington, DC: Government Printing Office.
USDA. 1940. “The Dust Bowl: Agricultural Problems and Solutions.” Editorial Reference Paper 7.
Volanto, Keith J. 2005. Texas, Cotton, and the New Deal. College Station, TX: Texas A&M Univer-
sity Press.
Wallace, H. 1938. Soils and Men: Yearbook of Agriculture 1938. Washington, DC: USDA.
Wenger, Leon E. 1941. “Re-establishing Native Grasses by the Hay Method.” Kansas State College of 
Agriculture and Applied Science Agricultural Experiment Station Circular 208.
Worster, Donald. 1979. Dust Bowl: The Southern Plains in the 1930s. New York: Oxford University 
Press.
